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Abstract
What lessons can the study of fundamentalism and the psychology of
religion teach the newer field of Radicalization and Involvement in
Violent Extremism (RIVE)? Four lessons and an intervention are offered
in this article: (1) Religion is a robust human experience and cultural
product that adopts a defensive shape when its worldview is threatened.
(2) This does not mean that all "fundamentalisms" or radical versions of
religion are somehow linked or perform similar functions; rather, they
reflect the limited human repertoire to threat, yet within different
cultural and historical contexts. (3) Causal explanations on the level of
the individual are insufficient to understand these movements. (4) There
is a modernist trend to elevate word-based, rational knowing over more
implicit, symbolic knowing in both fundamentalism and radical
discourses. Fundamentalism and radicalized religion seem to be the left
brain's attempt to"do" religion. And, it does this now even more
separately from the right brain compared to previous eras.1 (5) An
intervention addressing violent extremisms through value complexity
draws the above lessons together in an emergentist model that has an
empirical track record of success.
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Abstract
What lessons can the study of fundamentalism and the psychology of reli-
gion teach the newer field of Radicalization and Involvement in Violent 
Extremism (RIVE)? Four lessons and an intervention are offered in this 
article: (1) Religion is a robust human experience and cultural product 
that adopts a defensive shape when its worldview is threatened. (2) This 
does not mean that all "fundamentalisms" or radical versions of religion 
are somehow linked or perform similar functions; rather, they reflect the 
limited human repertoire to threat, yet within different cultural and his-
torical contexts. (3) Causal explanations on the level of the individual are 
insufficient to understand these movements. (4) There is a modernist 
trend to elevate word-based, rational knowing over more implicit, sym-
bolic knowing in both fundamentalism and radical discourses. Funda-
mentalism and radicalized religion seem to be the left brain's attempt to 
"do" religion. And, it does this now even more separately from the right 
brain compared to previous eras.1 (5) An intervention addressing violent 
extremisms through value complexity draws the above lessons together in 
an emergentist model that has an empirical track record of success.
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Introduction
The lessons to be learned for RIVE are an examination of how religion is 
being used, by whom, and for what purpose. Complex, interactionist, or 
emergentist research models that go beyond binary cause and effect are 
more adequate here, but they are less attractive to governments because 
they seem to be incapable of prediction and control. However, by the end 
of this article, it will become evident that reliable intervention can arise 
from an emergentist approach.
Lesson 1) Expect That Sacred Worldviews Will Be 
Defended
In the 19th century, the traditional Christian worldview was felt to be 
under threat, and Princeton theologians rose to defend the "fundamen-
tals" of the faith. American Protestant fundamentalism, from which all 
other fundamentalisms are named, sought to counter the challenge of 
Darwinism and higher biblical criticism. The central belief of Protestant 
fundamentalism is also its primary defense: the plenary inerrancy of 
Scripture. It is the words, not just the ideas, of Scripture that are deemed 
inerrant, and thus beyond the dismantling forces of higher criticism, Dar-
winism, and the liberalization of the modern age. Separatist and quies-
cent for fifty years after the humiliating Scopes trial in 1925, 
fundamentalist movements such as the New Christian Right began to 
emerge from 1979 onwards, along with Islamic, Hindu, Jewish, and other 
mobilizing religious ideologies.
Recent work in Terror Management Theory helps us to understand how a 
shared worldview provides individuals, in their day-to-day experience, 
with a defense from inevitable existential anxiety: the fear of death.2 A 
large body of research shows that subtle reminders of death increase the 
way people defend their cultural worldview.3 Cultural worldviews tran-
scend the individual and provide existential buffering, a sense of mean-
ing, and continuation after death. Given how vital cultural worldviews are 
to ward off existential anxiety, if the validity of a cultural worldview is 
threatened or damaged in the arena of ideas, this will foment an urgent 
search for a solution to reaffirm the worldview. This account maps on well 
to the rise of Christian fundamentalism, particularly in its early manifes-
tation, despite the predictions of secularization theorists.4
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The Fundamentalism Project directed by Martin Marty and Scott Appleby 
is a multi-disciplinary army of scholars to understand conservative, ideo-
logically-driven religious movements springing up around the world. 
Commonalities across the different fundamentalisms were urgently 
sought, and some were found:5
•   Traditional gender roles ensure a firm family structure
•   The rules of religion are deemed as literally binding, leading to a ten-
dency to separatism (for example, a rise in home schooling or faith-
based schools)
•   A binary cleavage carves the world into the saved in-group versus the 
shunned out-group, and
•   A yearning for a golden era of religious purity creates a reinterpreted 
past, or is cast into an eschatological future, requiring an apocalypse to 
trigger the new era6 
There is an armored structure to fundamentalisms: they are hierarchical 
(in regard to gender and religious leaders), centrally organized (around 
an authority belief), clearly demarcated against outsiders, and goal-driven 
towards a sacred past or future. What can be said of these varied funda-
mentalisms is that fundamentalism is not one "thing," but rather it is the 
shape that religion takes when it is under threat.7
Lesson 2) Avoid Over-Generalizing
Has the label fundamentalist been properly applied to Muslim contexts? 
Here, a different story is told. The failure of the modern nation-state 
(either through totalitarianism or a failed Marxist past) and the humilia-
tion of colonial experience entangled with rampant ongoing corruption 
created the context for radical discourse to arise. Current economic and 
political conditions compare poorly with life in Muslim lands long ago 
during the idyllic Golden Age of Islam. The answer: return to a pure Islam 
shorn of contemporary ethnic heritages shoe-horned into Western-
appointed states. The poetic writings of Qutb and others in the 1960s ech-
oed earlier Salafist writings, and rang true: only Islam can leverage an 
overturning of the status quo, unify diverse Muslim populations, and free 
them from Western influence. A highly selective and simplified version of 
the much-loved religious tradition was deployed. A confluence between 
the utopian, radical vision of Qutb was combined with the Wahabi Salafi 
version of Islam promoted by Saudi Arabia. Thanks to Saudi petrol dol-
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lars, the marketplace of ideas was flooded with Saudi religious resources 
serving the dual purpose of defending its own regime while mobilizing 
Western-diaspora alienated youths to jihad.
This movement is not about conserving a religious tradition, as in Chris-
tian fundamentalism. The newer term radicalization better describes this 
leveraging of change, religious and socio-political—via the selective 
Islamist narrative—a story that can give direction and meaning to 
oppressed or marginalized lives.
Historian Olivier Roy contends that political Islam has failed in its aim to 
achieve a purely Islamic polity.8 What remains of radical Islam has no 
practical agenda at all, says Roy.9 As the Taliban demonstrates, radical 
piety can lead to violence—a violence that is more symbolic than purpose-
ful. Frustration, utopian thinking, unemployed former mujahideen, and 
responses to real and perceived injustice have all combined to allow Al 
Qaida to export their jihadi tactics to western converts and western Mus-
lim youths with conflicted identities. The social and cognitive shape these 
movements have taken, like fundamentalism, reveals a similar structural 
firmness: hierarchical in regards to gender, centrally organized (around 
an authoritative narrative and around the extremist group leader), clear 
demarcation against outsiders, and goal-driven towards a sacred future. 
This does not mean that Islamist radicalization is the same as fundamen-
talism. The second lesson for RIVE is to beware of over-generalizing from 
one religious movement to another.
Rather, the similarities in the social, cognitive shape represent the limited 
human repertoire to address threat. This firm social, cognitive shape is 
the easiest means by which a movement enables itself to confront insu-
perable odds. (Other options, such as Ghandi's satyagraha are also possi-
ble, but so far, quite exceptional.) The purpose here is radical change, not 
the conserving of a current traditional worldview. Architects of radicaliza-
tion aim to overturn the traditional Muslim worldview, with themselves at 
the helm, although this desire for power is masked with Islamic rhetoric. 
A different kind of desperation for change in Muslim lands is suggested by 
the courage of ordinary people who are fomenting the Arab Spring.
Lesson 3) Simple Explanatory Models Will 
Not Suffice
Mono-causal explanations of a "medical model" kind have pervaded 
research into both fundamentalism and radicalization: find the cause in 
order to eradicate the disease. Given the security risks, governments, who 
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are key funders of this research, seek categorical answers to solve the 
problem of religious violence and terrorism. And clear-cut answers must 
be sought, in case they do exist. But fundamentalism and radicalization 
have turned out to be flames arising from more complex, shape-shifting 
wholes, rather than properties of deviant individuals.
The early study of fundamentalism in the psychology of religion was 
marked by a search for what was wrong with fundamentalists as individu-
als. These studies were mainly carried out on Protestant Christian funda-
mentalists in the USA, and sought to explain fundamentalism through 
individual deficiencies, such as lower levels of moral reasoning, greater 
punitiveness, prejudice (in regard to race, gender, political or sexual ori-
entation), authoritarianism, dogmatism, and occurrence of mental health 
problems.10 A binary mindset, similar to a fundamentalist mindset, seems 
to underpin this research: we are good (tolerant); they are bad (intoler-
ant). Perhaps psychologists, who are among the most non-religious of 
academics, were feeling under threat themselves when faced with this 
religious upsurge. There was early support for these hypothesized rela-
tionships, but research on fundamentalism has been qualified as it has 
progressed. The bigger picture now shows that when social class is held 
constant, religious items are neutral, and the intrinsic-extrinsic dimen-
sions of religiosity are accounted for, the correlations become negligible.11 
In fact, fundamentalists enjoy similar mental health benefits to other reli-
gious people: protection from depression, greater optimism, marital hap-
piness, and purpose in life.
There is a trade-off. Fundamentalist discourse does not allow people to 
improvise or to develop their religious thinking, and this lack of develop-
ment can mean the initial helpfulness turns sour. It is important to distin-
guish between those for whom fundamentalism is currently providing a 
"sacred canopy" that is adaptive from those for whom fundamentalism 
has become maladaptive. When a fundamentalist feels he or she has out-
grown fundamentalism, the process of leaving the fundamentalist "sacred 
canopy" is often de-stabilizing. Yao has dealt with people exiting funda-
mentalism who report extreme guilt and confusion, as well as loss of a val-
ued social group.12 When a person's relationships within the 
fundamentalist church break down, that person's entire worldview can be 
dismantled. This can contribute to depression, anxiety, and other clinical 
disorders. Pargament's research shows how spiritual trauma (trauma 
involving religious disappointment) levies high costs in terms of break-
downs, illness, and even death, unless there is sufficient social support on 
hand to help people integrate their trauma into new religious understand-
ings and identities.13
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Apart from studies of those exiting fundamentalism and some 
congregational studies, little attention has been paid to the group level of 
analysis. The study of fundamentalism gravitated towards the macro-
sociological level, or to the level of the individual.14 RIVE has already 
learned this lesson, thanks to in-depth interviews with incarcerated 
terrorists that focused on the group level of analysis.15, 16 These studies 
examine the power of the social group to shape thinking and behavior. 
Most studies of radicalization leading to violence show there is a period of 
immersion, at some point, in an extremist group. People are rarely 
radicalized in a vacuum. A social network links most violent extremists.17 
Tightly bounded groups requiring high levels of conformity and 
obedience are particularly effective at warding off feelings of uncertainty, 
and at presenting a reality that is beyond critique. The extremist, 
authoritarian group leader becomes the prototype around which 
vulnerable identities can model themselves. Groups reliably tend to 
polarize towards the more extreme views within the group.18 Fusion with 
the idealized group and separation from former ties can lead to de-
individuation and resultant diffusion of moral responsibility. 
Dehumanization of the out-group helps to erode the normal barriers to 
killing, legitimated by an unquestioned religious discourse.
Leaving extremist groups after intense immersion and sequestering bears 
similar costs to leaving fundamentalism: the loss of status within the 
group, the loss of belonging to a valued group, the shattering of meaning 
and a sacred worldview. People who leave extremist groups do so because 
of disillusionment with the totalist group leader, frustration with the low 
level of effectiveness in terms of achieving the group's aims, the high cost 
of an arduous lifestyle involving separation from family, and the forgoing 
of marital or employment prospects. Lessons for de-radicalization include 
understanding the way religion and social psychological processes have 
become entwined. Prison chaplains need theological understandings that 
enable growth beyond the radicalized version to the broader tradition. 
They also need to be resourced with social-psychological understandings 
of group behavior. This should be a top priority, as belonging to a group in 
prison is a necessary means of survival for inmates. Group processes in 
prison provide a ready-made vehicle for radicalization. De-radicalization 
initiatives in places such as Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Yemen, and Pakistan 
have learned that to enable detainees to disengage from violent 
extremism, they need to build new social networks, rebuild their family 
relationships, and rebuild their capacity to live and work in society. They 
need a mixed-method approach that includes job training, religious re-
education, family involvement, psychological counseling, rigorous 
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assessment, and ongoing surveillance after release. De-radicalization is 
necessarily multi-dimensional: practical, social, cognitive, and 
theological.
Individualist approaches marked the effort to find a terrorist profile in 
response to 9/11. But this research has foundered, and the lesson has been 
learned that individual pathology or demographics will not predict who 
turns to violence.19 One of the few recurrent findings is that those who 
engage in extremist violence usually have little if any traditional religious 
background. It seems that those without a religious background are taken 
in more easily by the selective, literalist version of Islam.
Religion does play a role. Scott Atran argues that terrorists are morally 
and religiously driven.20 Yet, religion is highly complex, and serves multi-
ple purposes in people's lives, both extrinsically and intrinsically. We 
need to disentangle the religious rhetoric of radicalizers from the deeper 
levels of religious motivation in people's lives. Youths abducted or lured 
into Taliban violence in Swat, Pakistan, or similarly in extremist move-
ments in other parts of the developing world, are mainly motivated by 
poverty and the hope for a meal.21 The Taliban's religious narrative is 
used to legitimate orders given by commanders. It is important to not 
essentialize religion as if it is a singular causal agent.
Lesson 4) Words Rule
What becomes dangerous in either fundamentalism or radicalization 
seems to arise from the interaction of modernity with ancient religious 
traditions. Shepherd noted that an "engineering," "black and white" men-
tality exists among Christian fundamentalists.22 Gambetta & Hertog's 
research demonstrates that engineers, graduates from a discipline that 
proceeds on correct mathematical answers to well-defined problems, are 
vastly over-represented among violent extremists.23
While many Christian fundamentalists are anti-evolutionist, they display 
a preference for hard facts and proper rational techniques. Barr noted 
how Christian fundamentalism stresses the material-physical accuracy of 
the Bible, and how it takes its method from a Newtonian model of sci-
ence.24 Biblical authority will always supersede scientific authority, and if 
that entails denying evolution, so be it. But objective truth is preferred, 
and this is what the Bible is considered to be. This is achieved through the 
fundamentalist belief system being structured around a central authority 
belief—the belief in scriptural inerrancy. Inerrancy is deemed sacred and 
inviolate, and serves to legitimate all other fundamentalist beliefs in a 
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one-way direction, with no "back talk" returning to modify the authority 
belief.25 Once this admittedly circular premise is accepted, fundamental-
ist thinking then proceeds logically and systematically.26
In this way, fundamentalists argue for a truth that is considered "objec-
tive," an object in the material world—just as science is the pursuit of 
"objective truth." To defend the faith, it borrows from science, as if to say: 
"If you have a materialist conception of truth with a commitment to ratio-
nal procedures, so do we." Ironically, Islam, which unlike Christianity, 
suffered no historical conflict between science and religion, seems now to 
be adopting a similar stance with its own version of creationism promoted 
worldwide from its base in Turkey.27 This new Islamic creationism bor-
rows heavily from the "science-like" arguments in contemporary Chris-
tian creationism concerning Intelligent Design.28 Islamic tracts handed 
out on university campuses typically stress the rationality of Islam, and 
radical versions of Islam deploy their most scathing attacks against tradi-
tional Muslim symbolic ritual practices. Sufi brotherhoods, once the dom-
inant means of the spread and practice of Islam, are considered "bida" 
(reprehensible innovation) by radical Islamists.
There is a modernist trend to elevate word-based, rational knowing over 
more implicit, symbolic knowing in both Christian fundamentalism and 
radical discourses. Monotheistic religion has always had a doctrinal 
(word-based) element, but prior to the Enlightenment, religious knowing 
involved a balance between word-based propositions and more symbolic, 
implicit forms of knowing that comprised the bedrock of traditional ritual 
practice.29, 30 As science has become the main model to which other 
sources of knowledge aspire, western and now Islamic societies have been 
losing the capacity to read their texts in a metaphorical-symbolic sense. 
Instead, they have become preoccupied with the empirical "veracity" of 
their content. A dearth of symbolic, implicational processing seems to 
make religious knowing more literalistic and inflexible.
A number of dual-process cognitive models make a similar distinction 
between "head" (rational word-based) and "heart" (emotional, implicit) 
processing. There is now huge empirical support coming from neuro-
science for these two different ways of processing information. McGil-
christ argues that, among primates, it is only in humans that the right and 
left hemispheres of the brain operate quite independently: humans have, 
as it were, two brains.31 Further, McGilchrist argues that the two hemi-
spheres are operating more independently now than in previous human 
history.
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In most people, the left brain, dealing with language, abstract reasoning, 
categorization and focused attention, is the dominant hemisphere. The 
left brain is focused on what it already knows and is not interested in what 
it does not know. Consistent with cognitive studies that demonstrate that 
most humans are "cognitive misers" and will protect existing knowledge 
systems against dissonance, the left brain is somewhat closed to new 
information.
In contrast, the larger, heavier, more powerful right brain seeks what it 
does not know. It is interested in the "other," and is highly connected with 
the rest of the nervous system, and thus with bodily states and emotions. 
The right brain is interested in faces and individuals; it is the seat of 
empathy, moral sense, and self-awareness. The right brain takes the 
broad view, considering the wider context, and puts things into perspec-
tive. The right brain is crucial to living in the real world (for example, 
stroke patients can continue to function with an impaired left brain, but 
they can not function at all with an impaired right brain). The right brain 
deals with particulars, not abstractions. But the word-based left brain 
drives modern culture with all its phenomenal technological achieve-
ments, and the right brain is now marginalized in education and culture.
Both right and left brain can do many of the same things. Both hemi-
spheres can "do" religion, but they do religion in a different manner. Fun-
damentalism and radicalized religion seem to be the left brain's attempt 
to "do" religion. And, it does this now even more separately from the right 
brain, as compared to previous eras.
Living in an increasingly left-brain, word-based dominated world has 
implications for moral values. In a recent study of Catholic Christians, 
Fontaine, Duriez, Luyten, Corveleyn, and Hutsebaut used Schwartz and 
Huisman's cross-culturally validated human values scales to examine 
which values participant used in their symbolic approach to their belief 
system in comparison with a literal approach to the belief system.32, 33 
They found that the symbolic approach highly correlated with the self-
transcending, pro-social values of benevolence and universalism (that all 
humans are equal in spiritual worth). In contrast, participants taking a 
literalist approach to their belief system showed high correlations with 
the values of power and security. Overall, there was a near perfect 
correlation of 0.95 for this "self-transcendent" versus "self-enhancement" 
pattern of values.
Why would there be such a strong correlation between symbolic thinking 
and pro-social, altruistic values, while the literal approach correlates 
instead with self-protective values of power and security? The study's 
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post-hoc explanation for this finding is that perspective-taking, the cogni-
tive component of empathy (the tendency to spontaneously adopt the psy-
chological point of view of others), enables pro-social behavior such as 
benevolence.
I now turn to a radicalization prevention program in the UK that 
addresses these factors (perspective taking and values) in a group context. 
This program shows that when participants achieve higher levels of com-
plexity in values and thinking (the ability to perceive multiple perspec-
tives), the radical binary mindset and approval for violent mobilization 
drops away. What emerges for participants is a more integrated British 
Muslim identity and a desire for pro-social methods to solve injustice.
5) An Intervention Addressing Violent Extremism 
through Value Complexity
Most research now acknowledges that there are multiple roads into radi-
calization, multiple roads out, and that only a few radicals go on to com-
mit acts of terrorism. Whatever pathway in or out, all radical discourses 
have in common a simple binary structure with black and white contrasts: 
we are right, they are wrong; we are the in-group, they are the out-group. 
This is the place we can intervene for prevention purposes.
Underlying this binary structure is the magnetic pull of one dominant 
moral value that has been promoted by the radicalized religious dis-
course. Extremist ideologies, whether right, left, secular, or religious, tend 
towards value monism. They reduce the complexity of the social world in 
order to mobilize action to one dominant moral value, in order to maxi-
mize the in-group's aims.
In contrast, all mainstream religious traditions are value plural, and thus 
more complex. In responding to different challenges over history, main-
stream religious traditions, such as Judaism, Christianity, or Islam, 
evolve to maximize, within historically imposed limits, the multiple com-
peting values of their constituencies.34 By this we mean that religious tra-
ditions take into account the multiple priorities of their communities. For 
example, when judging the appropriateness of the use of alcohol for phar-
maceutical reasons, Islamic jurisprudence usually rules that alcohol is 
allowed to sterilize instruments or skin, even though it is normally pro-
scribed. In this way the precept of prohibiting alcohol is balanced against 
the modern benefit of its pharmaceutical use, exemplifying how the 
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underlying value of purity (from contamination through contact with 
something considered haram, or off limits) is not an absolute when posi-
tioned relative to the value of health.35
Fundamentalist and radical groups are much less inclined to work out 
value tradeoffs. In an effort to offer simple solutions to a complex world, 
those overwhelmed by modernity, including most radical Islamists, 
become highly selective within their own traditions, emphasizing certain 
texts and interpretations while suppressing others.36 In this process, they 
radically alter traditional underlying value hierarchies by increasing some 
values' importance while dramatically decreasing that of others. Conse-
quently, these extreme versions of the tradition become less value plural 
to the point of absolute value simplification (value monism). This value 
monism is what constitutes the "radical" element in extremist Islamic 
groups and ideology.37 The example of jihadism is a clear example: 
(falsely) promoted as the most important "pillar," it is supposed to super-
sede the practices of the traditional pillars of Islam. In view of this, we 
argue that the appeal of radical groups can be countered by developing 
value complexity in line with the mainline tradition of the participants.
In 2010, our research group, the Psychology and Religion Research Group 
at the University of Cambridge, developed, and evaluated through pre- 
and post-testing, a prevention program in the UK entitled Being Muslim 
Being British, designed for young Muslims aged fifteen plus.38, 39 
Through eight sessions using DVD films and guided group activities, we 
operationalized the raising of complexity in the domain of moral values, 
using Suedfeld's concept of integrative complexity (IC). Integrative com-
plexity involves two steps. The first is to be able to differentiate different 
perspectives on an issue, to perceive other viewpoints, and to find some 
validity in them through perceiving the underlying values for each view-
point, thus laying the groundwork for perspective-taking. The next step is 
to integrate the differentiated viewpoints together in some kind of over-
arching framework. This could involve, for example, finding trade-offs 
between different perspectives or values in tension, being able to identify 
shared values between conflicting viewpoints, being able to find win/win 
solutions to opposing groups' goals, or finding some context that makes 
sense of why reasonable people can maintain opposite views.40
Low integrative complexity (IC) means only one perspective is considered 
valid: the world is cast in black or white, groups are good or bad, right or 
wrong, seen from one single evaluative viewpoint. Moderate levels of IC 
mean that a multiplicity of viewpoints can be considered, and some valid-
ity is seen in them, yet without the ability to see any overarching frame-
work. High levels of IC mean that thinkers are able to find integrating 
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frameworks for differing perspectives.41 In the field of political psychol-
ogy, the study of integrative complexity enjoys a robust empirical litera-
ture in dozens of studies over decades. These studies show that when 
political actors' level of integrative complexity drops (measured by coding 
speeches, parliamentary proceedings, press releases, letters, and so forth) 
from that actor's normal baseline, that sudden drop in the complexity of 
the structure of thinking predicts intergroup conflict, violence, and even 
military action.42 What causes IC to drop? Research shows it is prolonged 
stress and threat to important values, and this in turn predicts intergroup 
conflict—just as Christian fundamentalism created a binary discourse to 
counter liberalizing forces in order to protect its sacred worldview. What 
promotes higher levels of IC is the motivation to maximize a wider array 
of one's own important values; and for religious people, this must include 
sacred values.43
In short, Being Muslim Being British is a primary prevention initiative 
that raises participants' levels of integrative complexity (IC) and increases 
the spread of values to include both traditional religious and modernist 
secular values as a means of preventing violent extremism and promoting 
social cohesion in a globalized context. It is reputedly one of the first pre-
vention programs with empirically measurable outcomes benchmarked 
against extremist violence using the non-fakable measure of IC coding, 
which codes the less-than-conscious structure of thinking, based on ver-
balizations arising from activities at the very beginning and at the end of 
the course.44 The two hypotheses we advanced and tested were that as a 
result of the intervention, participants will think in more complex ways 
about social issues underlined by conflicting values, and that participants 
will deploy a greater range of values. Research based on eighty-one partic-
ipants across seven pilot courses around the UK (each course comprising 
sixteen contact hours) shows that IC rises significantly in each pilot group 
by the end of the course, and that the spread of values increases signifi-
cantly, in comparison with levels before the course. Our post hoc analysis 
results also show that high IC significantly correlates with participants' 
choosing pro-social activism rather than violent mobilization. Religious 
identity is affirmed and strengthened through the course.45, 46
Both word-based—rational—and symbolic, implicational processing are 
needed to scaffold the ability to think more complexly. To operationalize 
value complexity in the eight-session course, we help participants to dis-
cover some validity in a range of viewpoints (evenly weighted and neu-
trally labeled) on eight contested topics in radical discourse, using DVD 
film. Participants are enabled to achieve differentiation by "laddering 
down" to explore the value spectrums that underlie and make sense of the 
different viewpoints. This is done verbally and through activity, for exam-
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ple "voting with your feet" to explore the implications of standing at vari-
ous points along a value spectrum laid out on the floor. This shift from the 
concrete level to the abstract level of values enables a cognitive bridge to 
new ways of thinking.47
Through carefully structured group activities (debates, dramas, games, 
tasks) for each topic, we evoke symbolic, implicational processing 
employing action learning through movement, emotions, social interac-
tion, and visual symbols. This embodied, implicational processing sup-
ports tolerance of the topic's multi-valence, promoting openness to 
perceiving some validity in both seemingly conflicting value poles.48 Par-
ticipants thus engage in multiple-level processing. This leads towards a 
sense of "gestalt" underlying the viewpoints in tension and provides a 
bridge to enable rational, word-based integration of viewpoints into their 
existing belief systems.49 Through the group activities, we draw on the 
body's implicit way of knowing. The mind needs the body for successful 
engagement with the world, and body sensations help us to know what is 
important to us—what are our own values, and how to understand 
another's values.50, 51 Group tasks that use some "everyday" movement 
effectively switch off the conceptual mode of mind.52 This helps with pre-
cision in thinking and enables people to get beyond bluntly categorizing 
into black and white, and to attend with greater specificity to the complex-
ity of the present, indicating greater right-brain activity.53 For example, 
when participants in our intervention were asked to verbally describe two 
different modes of political decision-making (one democratic, and the 
other under a Caliphate), no commonalities or ways of relating the two 
could be found; the two means of decision making were seen in terms of 
black and white contrasts. But when the participants created non-verbal 
mimes (and performed them for "a visiting Martian") to describe both 
modes of decision-making, their mimes enabled them to see with greater 
detail the areas of commonality shared between democratic and religious 
modes of decision-making. Participants were enabled to overcome the 
binary black-and-white structure that governed their thinking about the 
Caliphate and democracy. Some typical participant responses to the 
Being Muslim Being British (BMBB) course are:
"This course has made me proud of myself as a Muslim and proud 
of myself to live in this country. And I can say, in an authoritative 
way, I can be a Muslim and I can be British as well and contribute 
to this society."
– BMBB Participant
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"I realized how strong my actual beliefs and values are in all the 
situations we were put through. It's also helped me… to break 
away from a kind of tunnel-vision thinking, that everything is 
kinda straightforward: all or nothing… I would have just dis-
missed things very quickly. This course has helped me say, 'Okay, 
let me just take a look at that thing and settle my mind a bit.' It 
has helped me understand how different people think."
– Participant
"This course has reminded us of the very basic points the Prophet 
has taught us: that Islam is the middle way. We shouldn't be 
extreme in any way, we should come halfway to understand who-
ever is opposite to us… We are not the only people to live on this 
earth, we have to always find common ground, to come together 
with other communities where we live."
– Participant
"The [local] BMBB experience showed that at the beginning the 
whole group …aligned with the Hizb ut Tahrir. But at the end of 
the course all of them had significantly changed their position."
– Local course facilitator (leader)
For the purposes of prevention, the group activities are designed to re-
create the social-psychological processes that shape thinking in extremist 
groups. We do this so that the social processes that constrict cognition 
(such as group polarization, groupthink, in-group/out-group dynamics) 
become "live" in the room.54, 55, 56 By making these processes conscious 
through experiencing them, and then talking about them, participants are 
free to think for themselves according to their own range of values, and to 
avoid a collapse into a binary way of thinking influenced by group pro-
cesses. Participants' religious commitment remains statistically 
unchanged; in fact, it is slightly enhanced. Participants who scored high-
est on identifying with their (chosen) social group in the post-test condi-
tion also showed higher IC.
This intervention will be adapted for use in Pakistan's only de-
radicalization program for young people under age eighteen in autumn 
2011 (at Sabaoon in Swat, Pakistan, directed by Dr. Peracha of the Hum 
Pakistani Foundation). A pilot will be run with thirty-five of the most 
extreme ex-Taliban youths at Sabaoon, and ongoing assessment will 
provide longitudinal data on the impact of the intervention before being 
more widely deployed for prevention purposes for Pakistani youth.
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Conclusion
To summarize, developing high integrative complexity thinking in the 
domain of moral values can serve as a preventative inoculation against 
uncertainty states that can be potentially exploited for violence. At higher 
levels of complexity in values and thinking, new possibilities emerge for 
participants. The program is not focused upon individual pathology and 
trying to correct it. We do not train facilitators to confront maladaptive 
thinking, nor do we promote a particular "correct religious understand-
ing." That would risk replacing one binary with another, and the underly-
ing condition would remain: simplified, binary, impoverished cognition 
in the religious domain. Our emergentist model posits that at higher lev-
els of complexity in thinking and in the moral domain, powerful changes 
occur for participants that enable personal integrity and strongly corre-
late with eschewing violence and choosing pro-social means of activism to 
address grievances.
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